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On the Notions of Police/State (of Situation): An Economic
Perspective in Light of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
Uroš Kranjc
Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
The article discusses the Hegelian opposition between institutions
of Police and Corporation, leading to the objective spirit formed
in the notion of the State. Juxtaposing both of Hegel’s
institutions against the usage of these notions proposed by
Jacques Rancière (Police) and Alain Badiou (State of the Situation)
opens a critical dividing line. We emphasize the inadequate
handling of economic factors inherent in both notions,
consequently obfuscating the economic conditioning of the
political dimension in the social body. Moreover, we supplement
both of the institutions with an economic-counterpart notion; to
Police we add “Private Property” and to Corporation “State of
Technology”. Further, we apply Badiou’s handling of Hegel’s
dialectics as the dialectics of “constitutive scission”. The dialectical
play of private property and state of technology is distinguished
in the dialectics of algebra of places and topology of
localizations. The resulting intersection is shown to be the place
of torsion – corresponding to the place of the Subject – an
interval, where we confront an uttered “wrong”, an interruption
in the smooth counting of parts in a social body. This torsion is
an immanent backside operation of the economic structure as far




The great dialectic in our time is not, as anciently and by some still supposed, between
capital and labor; it is between economic enterprise and the state1
John Kenneth Galbraith
What is market economy the name of? Capitalism. What then is capitalism the name
of? Of a specific mode of production. What is this specific mode of production the name
of? That of a determinate distribution of private ownership over knowledge and technol-
ogy. At first glance, this reasoning indeed seems trivial, perhaps even naïve, for it shows
the simplicity with which one assigns the metonymical signification of human and social
structures. An economic inquiry into the history of mankind shows a generic mediating
agency of an individual’s work capacity for the material reproduction of natural
resources. In their quest for self-preservation, individuals and communities indefinitely
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seek and maintain knowledge about the laws of nature, about possible ways of exploiting
land and resources, transforming them into need-satisfying objects. The unity of a
specific stage of knowledge and technology shapes the circumstances of a determinate
period in time, mediating the modes of being, living, communicating and cooperating.
It is the innovative spirit of the human animal that enables automatic emergences of
new elements to an existing technological structure – establishing the distribution of
the sensible and reflecting its own progress. It does so by presupposing a basic or
further developed bond. This bond sustains a community in the form of an infor-
mation-communicational network with the aim of transferring the needs and wants to
its parts. An individual defined along these lines becomes a part of the whole (of a com-
munity) with which he primordially attains the property of a site, the land where he
resides, lives and absorbs the necessary resources for his subsistence – by utilizing his
generic being, work. This fact had, from a historical perspective, resulted in a necessity
for work specialization and lead to various forms of work organization, innovation
and advances in human achievements, creating different states of technology via revolu-
tionary discoveries. In actuality, it presupposes a relational network between individuals,
and consequently between communities, whose inert and indifferent force resides in the
private ownership of a piece of land (i.e. the site) and all of the potentialities it brings.
Since we are dealing with a network, we are always confronted with at least two sides,2
resulting in a contradiction of forces pertaining to the relationship between internality
and externality. The dividing line between internality and externality is drawn with
the notion of private ownership. Not yet developed capitalist private property, this own-
ership of sites and primordial land belongs to individuals and communities that simul-
taneously structure their mode of technology (be it prehistoric hunting, iron smelting, or
modern production lines and information technology) – not by conditioning the former
by the latter, but fulfilling a mutual relationship. In terms of the history of productive
forces it is in stricto sensu that the unity of private ownership and the state of technology
establishes the ground for production. Or put more generally, it lays the groundwork for
different institutional frameworks, reflecting different stages of social organization, but at
the same time cunningly devising the conditions for the emergence of an out-placed
element, i.e. forming an ex-timate relation.
In the past, different communities and societies have seen significant population
growth due to this newly organized production, resulting in complex intersubjective
relations and challenges to organizing societal well-being. The institution of the police
historically evolved as an agency for mediating individual misconduct, ensuring tidiness,
enforcing municipal rules and standards in cities or the poleis, but also charged with
maintaining order in the marketplace since its very inception. As far as the modern
police institution goes, its birth can be traced to the end of the seventeenth century, devel-
oping simultaneously with modern nation states. The police institution conceptually
evolved to its present form as a consequence of changes in the reigning mode of pro-
duction (i.e. determinate state of technology) and societal transformation to a class-
dominated society.3 Naturally, it serves the ruling class, protecting its privately attained
control and usage of scarce resources. By capitalizing on its political influence over state
bureaucracy, it also gains control over disposable state apparatuses. This is a point the
young Marx is also making in his Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’, but rushing
on in subsuming the police and judiciary – the spheres of civil society – immediately
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and directly under an already fully developed notion of state administration, i.e. bureauc-
racy in a state controlled by the bourgeoisie.4We, however, will be taking a slower pace in
the dialectical steps towards the state.
Against such a background should one approach Jacques Rancière’s and Alain
Badiou’s critiques of today’s prevailing capitalist mode of production. If Rancière expli-
citly relies on Michel Foucault’s notion of police, subsuming it as a universal instrument
of modern societies, together with medicine, welfare and culture, it nonetheless seems
odd that he chooses not to explicitly endorse Foucault’s clear claim that the notion of
the police is coextensive with the rise of commerce and population – subjects being sub-
jugated to market relations of a state.5 Similarly, Badiou highlights our present state (of
situation) as capitalo-parlamentarism, identifying its regulative norms as: the economy in
terms of the capital bourgeoisie, the nation in terms of national states, and (representa-
tive) democracy in the form of free opinions and associations expressed in parliaments.
He deploys a stringent critique against Western liberal democracies in terms of corrupt
relations of private ownership and capitalist mode of production – exposing the econ-
omic dimension in his very naming of our present state(s) of situation. The name of
this economic dimension in our liberal societies is of course the capitalist mode of pro-
duction, going along with its “fantastic objectivity”. It seems that both Rancière and
Badiou choose to neglect this dimension in their handling of the coming political
sequences of subjectivization. In doing so, they relegate politics to an unnecessary inde-
termination by sidestepping one of its prime presuppositions. Here, we come to a full
circle, where the economic presuppositions begin to lack in the regulative categories of
the state, although they should, simultaneously, be taken as a precondition to any subjects
of institutional change. In order to break out and answer our initial question of naming
“the determinate distribution of private ownership over concurrent knowledge and tech-
nology”, we have to return to the name of Georg W. F. Hegel and his ideal(istical)ly com-
prehensive notional grounding of institutions in Civil Society leading to the unfolding of
the State as a dialectical play on the notions of Police and Corporation. In this essay we
thus propose a juxtaposition of Hegel’s vis-à-vis Badiou’s or Rancière’s position on the
notions Police/State of Situation and Corporation by highlighting (1) Hegel’s affinity
of political economy and his progression towards the institutions of the state, focusing
primarily on economical notions. In the second section (2), we interpret these notions
while quickly overviewing and endorsing Badiou’s interpretation of Hegel’s dialectical
matrix developed in Theory of the Subject. Consequently, we test a new thinking of the
institutions Police and Corporation against this matrix. In the last section (3) we try
to critically assess the proposed conceptions of above authors and give concluding
remarks.
From Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage” to “Police and Corporation”…
We have implicitly presupposed that institutional frameworks receive their content
through different stages in human social evolution: individuals forming communities,
estates being transformed into classes, classes dissolving into an array of identity
multiples. Take for instance the organization of feudal society; its production and
distribution relied on the reciprocal exchange of handicraft products, the develop-
ment of guilds and petty commerce. The antagonism between lord and serf in
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feudal societies referred to an explicit and elementary opposition between inclusion/
exclusion in partaking in estates grounded on any contingent type of ownership.
This antagonism was completely absorbed with the emergence of civil societies in
the arising world of the bourgeoisie. The process of specialization has taken its posi-
tive toll: workshops have transformed into small businesses and fortunate serfs have
succeeded in starting their own productive entities by means of craftsmanship. What
was left behind was the third estate, men with no qualifications, those poorest who
were excluded from societal transformations. The notion of property acquired new
determinations: master-craftsmen, on the one hand, became owners of partial links
in the newly formed production chain, getting hold of serfs and bare workers. On
the other, the business class of merchants and new industrialists started heavily
accumulating capital and communicating new needs for production from newly
shaped markets. The intertwining of the economic and political signified a sublation
of feudalism into capitalism, and was at the time wittingly encapsulated by Hegel in
his figurative analysis of Lordship and Bondage. The newly emerged mechanical art
of guilds and handicrafts, becoming a new aesthetic of specialized labour, have led to
the necessary historical conditions for the start of the industrial revolution. Here
Hegel employs all his intellectual might in dissecting the bond arising from the cre-
ation of civil society: he illuminates the specific mediation of relations among people
by describing a rupture – between those who take up the risk of death (and receive
a reward for their superiority over life in the form of enjoyment) and those who are
reduced to merely bare (the reproduction of material) life.
The fundamental opposition in feudalism is grounded in this antagonism between
Master and Slave, being two entities together with their asymmetric intersubjective
relationship. While first representing the simple opposition of two single individuals,
the emergence of civil society now also presents a new singular trait, an immanent differ-
ence – the reversal, where the master becomes the slave of a slave. The slave has to abolish
his desires for the sake of producing goods for the master, but nonetheless in the end re-
creates the material reproduction of human history amid his foreclosed enjoyment. What
are then the underlying causes of this analysis and consequently, what new conclusions
can still be drawn for contemporary economic and political philosophy? Let us first high-
light the fact that Hegel’s theorizing in the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, in particu-
lar the sub-section on Civil Society evolved from his in-depth studies of economic
forefathers, such as James Steuart, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, in parallel with
his simultaneous reading of Montesquieu and the German Historical School. He had
accumulated and synthesized the outlines (in theMorality sub-section) of civic societies’
transformations into a full-fledged ethics engendered in a newborn State. We must stress
Hegel’s strong affinity towards the laws of political economy (in his readings of Steuart)
as they emerged at the backlash of the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of
production – and were subsumed under the concept of the State. But why is this particu-
lar background important? Because it acknowledges and affirms Herbert Marcuse’s claim
in reading Hegel that:
The principle of idealism, that objective being depends upon thought, is now interpreted as
the basis for the potential-property character of things. At the same time, it is the most veri-
table being, mind, that idealism conceives as fulfilling the idea of ownership.
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Hegel’s analysis of free will gives property a place in the very make-up of the individual, in
his free will. […] The materialization of the idea begins when the emancipated individual
asserts his will as a freedom to appropriate. ‘This first phase of freedom we shall know as
property’.6
The system of needs has for its presupposition the notion of civil society, since it is pre-
cisely from this system where for Hegel freedom emerges; and in the midst of safeguard-
ing the first phase of freedom lies the administration of justice. Hegel says:
The substantial ground for the Whole is the right of property. The system of needs and its
entanglement cannot exist without law. The greatest attribution, a man can give to industry,
is by utilizing a strict and firm administration of justice. To this also amounts as a ground
the property in all its objectivity.7
Marcuse presents a number of arguments stating that for Hegel, the institution of prop-
erty represents an ontological relation.8 It must be emphasized that this reasoning is
reflected in Hegel’s reading of Steuart’s monograph An Inquiry into the Principles of Pol-
itical Economy; a work that can be read as an economic action plan for concrete policies,
thus guiding the ruler in his governance of the state according to well-known utilitarian
principles. In these lines (and other Scottish Enlightenment figures), Hegel understood
the significance of property relations in the strictest sense: in the light of corporative
landscape of the emerging capitalist order and its sublation in the notion of an arising
State. The problem, however, is precisely the following: in contrast to Hegel’s handling
of the notions of Civil Society and State in his philosophy of right, both Rancière and
Badiou opt for a notional shortcut to arrive at the concept of the State. On their direct
Police – State of Situation – State axis, they both – either deliberately or not – miss-
out on a crucial key dialectical link necessary for reaching the concept of the State.
The system of needs in the new evolving civil society is first something immediate and
inconsistent, stemming from particular needs and wants of individuals constituting
such a society. We need not emphasize the following fact: needs and wants, when
fulfilled by produced and exchanged objects, in-themselves also already contain the prop-
erty relation – and are represented as reified. Such a system, unordered at first, needs an
ordering regime, a réglementation, determining the reflection of its sheer dispersion. In
his Disagreement, Rancière does so implicitly, whereas Badiou in his Being and Event
chooses an entirely explicit option for such representational operation. Using the hierar-
chy of infinite number cardinalities, he thereby imposes an operational regime of count –
the introduction of a consistent non-Whole (while sacrificing completeness).
In our case, we are classifying an unordered system of needs and wants. Their division
and distribution adheres to a logic of classes grounded on the main attribute – private
property. It is precisely with this operation that the whole economic sub-structure col-
lapses into the counting of (social, political) parts and their designation to a class struc-
ture; one that is immediately subsumed under the concept of the State.9 We propose the
following solution, following up on Hegel and his reading of Scottish political econom-
ists: there is a necessary additional and crucial step required in order to mediate the
unfolding of the notion of State. It is sustained in the dialectics of two institutions:
Police and Corporation. The former at first hand and chiefly arranges the safeguarding
of individuals in their mutual relations, but also overlooks the contingent exchange of
private property as one of its main preoccupations. It is only after the determination
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of reflection, based on corporate institution or corporate law (in addition to family law)
that engenders a regulative mechanism for both the needs and production of commod-
ities is achieved, a full and universal working of civil society bounded by the State can be
attained. The proposed argument diverges from the one put forward by Rancière and
Badiou; first, it has in common the reflection of the final object – the status and site of
the rabble, i.e. the part-of-no-part, the siting at the edge of the void. For both, this
part represents a consequential object of a miscount, i.e. the second count made by
the Police/State of situation, which opens up the gap of a “forced” upheaval of an in-exist-
ent singularity. Hegel, on the other hand, develops the notion of the rabble prior to that
of the State, and while Frank Ruda has proposed his “solutions of poverty that the rabble
names”,10 we wish to highlight the one in the gap between police and corporation to be
the universalization of all the others. It is precisely in this gap that the class configuration
takes place as far as individual’s material subsistence is concerned. However, it is also
where it finds its institutional homeland in the form of the state.
Our modern industrial and corporative system introduced both a new organization of
the workplace and the distribution of labour power – consequently implementing new
relations of production, i.e. new machine-based production-operations management,
accumulation of capital via reinvested profits, etc. The technological rupture at the
heart of the industrial revolution, marching hand in hand with the division of labour,
has brought a multitude of commodities exchanged on newly emerged markets. Far
more importantly, in the same stroke it has also sublated the immediate contradiction
of the master-servant relation. The sublation, unfortunately, did not simply mean its res-
olution; it meant an additional mystification of the contradiction – a mediated contradic-
tion – encapsulated by Marx’s commodity fetishism. The fundamental question remains
in the post-modern era: on the one hand, relations amongmen appear as relations among
free individuals in exchange, stripped from their bonds of land or fiefs. On the other
hand, of these same men, caught up in a web of fetishist relations of relations among
things – now the interplay of use and exchange values reigns supreme.
In the following passages, we shall modify Badiou’s early matrix of the Hegelian dia-
lectic and take a parallax view of the Police and Corporation institutions from an econ-
omic point of view. Put differently, we will test both driving modes behind the police and
corporation, namely private property and the mode of production/state of technology
against both Hegelian and Badiou/Rancière’s setting.
That Something (Etwas) and its Place in the Institutional Framework
We have designated the institutions11 of (private) property and technology as our point of
departure. Let us posit the following proposition: in the strictest economic sense, a
boundary line is drawn between sites that have the attribute of (private) property, separ-
ating them from those who do not possess any such attribute – distinguishing sites with
productive capacity and wealth of multiplicities from the ones who are excluded from
this attribution. This proposition can also be turned into a factual starting point for
the history of economic analysis, namely, the inquiries into natural productivity of
land appropriation. The productive soil was initially distributed by mankind with the
sole purpose of self-preservation; only at the later stages of historical development, it
evolved into a determining force for the distribution and hierarchy of primordial sites
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(of property). It was the creative imagination of humanity that made the appropriation of
natural resources a mediating productive force of its own development in terms of dis-
posable technology. Put differently, technology imposes the limit points and becomes the
mode for the distribution of multiplicities among sites – determining a strict frontier
between inclusion and exclusion. In Civil Society, we see such a demarcation line
between interiority and exteriority manifested in the notions of the Police and Corpor-
ation, in the end becoming unified and sublated in the notion of the State. Let us argue
here that we are dealing with a specific dialectic of distribution of sites, one that can be
traced back to the earlier writings12 of Alain Badiou and his transition from structural
to materialist dialectic. He sets himself the task of finding solutions and answering the
question of what topological ramifications are immanent to thinking the dialectic of
One divides into Two – in the “thing in itself” and the “thing for other”? The interlocutor
is of course Hegel and his Science of Logic, where we have something (Etwas) strictly in a
differential relation with something else (Anderes) that has for its determination a dis-
tinction, a difference. Badiou views here the dialectic as a process of internal scission.
It is the Two giving concept to the One, not the other way around. An existing A is
posited twice: first, as a pure being A and second, as being placed (on a site) Ap (the
sites being distributed in a topological space P). This something-in-itself and some-
thing-for-the-other being introduced as pure identity and placed identity. It results in
a repetitive placing and naming the multiplicity of different As according to a distributive
mapping on a topological space P.
We must thus posit a constitutive scission: A= (AAp),
13 by means of which we are
stating the basic law of the structural dialectic, Badiou adds. It comes as no surprise
that he introduces the scission of A (i.e. in its pure being and being-placed) primarily
on the representational example of the proletariat and the bourgeois world (nota bene,
not bourgeoisie) – the proletariat as an element has to have a topological space-place
where it can find its site and sublate the whole of space. Remember that Badiou desig-
nates14 the term splace (esplace) to the space of placement (i.e. the action of the structure
P), while naming the placed term, being his force within a place, an outplace, offsite
(horlieu); in our case, the proletariat, excluded form a determinate form of society, or
rather seeking a site in a specific hierarchy of sites. Now, the immediate aim of such an
outplaced element is precisely the destruction of this hierarchy of sites – the sp(l)ace of
classes. With a little bit of wit, Badiou derives its force by the ability of producing
torsion over the splace. The ability lies in the fact of acknowledging the determination
of an outplaced element (A(Ap(A))), splitting the force into two actions of determination
(the second being determination of determination) and reapplying itself onto whence it
conflictually emerged.
This short and condensed introduction to Badiou’s understanding of dialectical move-
ment leads us to our initial problem. In the introduction, we sketched a “transhistorical”
outline of founding economic institutions for human generic activity: (private) property
and technology. As far as economic theory is concerned, man becomes interesting the
moment he appropriated his piece of nature with land and used his reason in transform-
ing it for private use. The pathway to installing products and commodities was open.
Meanwhile, an equally important insurrection of technology was taking place, back-
wardly established as different stages of humanity’s technological advance. It matters
little whether we encounter a simple set of information to manufacture a bow and
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arrow or knife – all the way to today’s complex particle accelerators or wireless electro-
magnetic power transmitters –, such data sets constitute information by means of which
the state of technology is defined. On the other hand, it is the state of technology that
retroactively superimposes and mediates the determinations of (private) property and
thus organizes human intentions in their unity. Just consider Marx’s in-depth analysis
in Grundrisse (the Forms which precede capitalist production subsection).
If we now return to Badiou’s logical schema, we get the relation property/technology
expressed as A/Ap, where A means property relation (own products of labour, land,
labour-capacity, etc.) and Ap the space where A is placed – in a specific state of technol-
ogy, mode of production P. Simply put, Ap defines the divided essence of A in a space P,
hence Ap(AAp). Our challenge, once again, is to search for a contemporary definition of
the opposition between the bourgeois world and the element of the proletariat in an age
of current financial capitalism. The “notorious” element should now be called the non-
identity multiplicity; the stage of technology is our information age and the mode of pro-
duction is called the financial capitalist institutional framework. We must not overlook
Badiou’s succinct and powerful notion of constitutive scission and the consequences it
brings about – following Hegel, he opts for evocating relapses in an affirmation of a for-
ceful subjectivation, be it leftist or rightist. We must remember that this arc also re-con-
nects his Theory of the Subject with Logics of Worlds. The dialectical play from
contradiction to constitutive scission with the demarcation of limit, distinguishing old
from new, is expressed with the following schema:
1. option Ap (Ap) = P; relapse into general space
A = (AAp) → Ap (AAp)
scission determination
2. option Ap(A); determination proper
The second option opens up only the possibility for a new determination; a series of
concrete outcomes that were seen in reactionary (think Thermidorian) action in the after-
math of 1968, mass movements in China during the late 1960s and even more in early
1970s, or even after the Occupy Wall Street movements in 2010, all in the form of
prima facie new discourses, later became abuses of events overtaken by social-democratic
and socialistic parties, unions and other social initiatives. These multiplicities manifested
themselves as a leftist safeguarding of particularized and homogenized interests of the
social body. Badiou calls this instance the reaffirmation of pure identity A(A), the loss
of perceiving any newness and neutralizing the transformational force – a pure and
useless adventurism, e.g. in May 1968. On the other hand, we have an even worse rightist
relapse termed Ap (Ap) = P, where everything collapses into place P, the neoliberal order
of things and in certain instances, also in today’s uprising obscurantist movements using
contemporary tools of social media technology (rise of nationalisms and populisms in the
past and today). But very rarely do we have the chance to see a proper change, being a
dialectical combination of the determination Ap(A) and the limit A(Ap) in their unity.
Badiou had already developed his understanding of topology while reading Hegel. His
collected comments in The Rational Kernel of the Hegelian Dialectic draw us, the readers,
to ponder on the interiority/exteriority dichotomy in relation to the object and in doing
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so engages us to posit new topologies of knowledge. Like Badiou, we should likewise ask
ourselves how to think the unity of notions that determine the contradiction – difference,
scission –, and the form of their (dis)symmetry? We are confronted with either a weak or
strong difference; the former giving us a spatial dispersion of the partitioning of the sen-
sible (a difference of site in place, A/Ap), a structural side, the latter introducing a quali-
tative heterogeneity, the historical side. Here Badiou makes an irrevocably questionable
step in subsuming all of the economical strata to the structural side of difference, thus
foreclosing any potentiality of change to economic factors. We shall return to this.
The unity of the Two in structural vocabulary entails the question of interiority/exterior-
ity, its solution lying in the separation into opposites – think of a Moebius strip – where
the interior and exterior is obfuscated. Badiou is faithful to Lacan here by positing that
such a constitutive cut precedes the Subject. “The subject is the act situated between the
one of the all and its effect of the orientation of inside/outside. A subject is the undoing of
torsion”.15 However, the following is significant for our current critique of political
economy: “Every schema distributes a series of places and leads us back to structures;
every discourse fixes the splace of the very thing that it passes over in silence”.16 The
introduction of force as a motor of change seems almost anticipated, otherwise there
would be no room for any structural or historical transformation induced by the outplace
element in relation to the structure as a whole. At this point we will conclude our short
examination of Badiou’s early theorizing on the algebra of sites, one based on Jacques
Lacan’s dialectic of the Real (structural dialectic), now supplemented with the topology
of forces (historical dialectic) and move one step further. The condition for materialist
dialectic is to think both of these conceptions in their unity; the relations of belonging
and exclusion apply to the first, while the terms of localization, adherence, and the dis-
tancing from itself-as-other apply to the second. Elements vs. parts – to the former the
vanishing, absence of cause, ex-timacy, to the latter a topological excess in a specific struc-
ture and apropos its periodization. Badiou’s critique of the structural dialectic proceeds
along the lines of a weak and strong (qualitative) difference, the absence and causality
of cause. Our aim will be to shift the dispositive into the political-economic encounter
of the algebra of places and topology of spaces in light of the opposition between concepts
of police and corporation.
If we consider the distribution of places and its specific exteriority, stemming from the
ancient atomist’s void-clinamen all the way to contemporary mass movements, we get
the constituting of an antagonistic and thereby excluded element, never truly
(s)placed, conversely always representing an outplace as a contingent element – the
void. The excluded element, now operating as a vanishing force of the void, on the
other hand, maintains the consistency of places by ceaselessly reapplying itself, injecting
being into the lack and leaving the traces of an extinguished working of a force – an
excess.
From a Hegelian point of view, Badiou’s matrix delivered in The Theory of the Subject
comes nearest to the dispositive of the critique of political economy, or put differently, is
the nearest to the police-corporation dialectic, with which we address the discourse of
concurrent economic science. Today, there still persists a clear urge to find a setting
for heterodox economics, while dealing with the epistemological blindness of main-
stream economics, whereby economic theorizing would be able to retrace its steps and
return to politico-philosophical underpinnings. Marx addressed the issue in a German
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idealist manner, i.e. with a continuous gap between content and form, think of commod-
ity and money object or surplus value and rate of profit. To Lenin and Mao in particular,
it meant the problem of an antagonistic contradiction – irreconcilable opposites presup-
posing their sublation. In our present case: Why is the contemporary economic discourse
a captive of theoretical (and practical) relapses and repetitions ad infinitum? One can
only hear an echoing of Althusser’s answer in the blowing lyrics of ideological state appa-
ratuses. But if we want to avoid an answer relying on ideological superstructure, a
different route must be taken. In Theory of the Subject Badiou shows us a new vector
of reasoning in dealing with the absences of cause, repetitive gaps and the crucial distinc-
tion derived from Hegel’s handling of subjective and objective force. Consequently, he
also comes closest in explicating the role of economic factors determining the splace,
whereas in the Being and Event (state-of-situation) they become completely absent. To
refer back to our A/Ap dialectic and present it in practical terms: our institutional frame-
work of financial capitalism has shed a specific distribution of places in which any kind of
subjective force, the preceding process to subjectivation, is rendered into an objective
one. Put another way, a subjective force is being ceaselessly divided and distributed
amongst the struggles of non-identity multiplicities, placed, and finally drawn into the
objectivity of the splace. It is done so in the automaticity of the reigning mode of pro-
duction, our institutional framework, which calls these objective “anomalies” (both posi-
tive and negative) an externality. This entity has become a central tenet and concrete
course of action for day-to-day economics, the relentless internalization of all forces
into marketable objects and the resolve of any individual or social misdoings. It is
where the Police/State of situation kneels in day-to-day routines before economic
mastery. The resulting evidence: trading with pollution emissions, substantial monetary
prizes for savvy business-oriented civil activists (i.e. the leaders of different social move-
ments in the fight for specific rights, etc.), and the adverse effects of social media plat-
forms, to name but a few.
A simple answer would argue for the following interpretation: we are in fact enveloped
in an ideological clout. It is precisely the opposite; capitalism’s ulterior incentive is the
undoing of wrongs, mishaps or other social dysfunctions, traversing the prevailing ideol-
ogy on these occasions for a glimpse. It does so automatically, sliding from one issue to
the next in the midst of crises, superseding any true political action for objective solution
(think of resolutions and concessions to the “Yellow Vests” movement). It gives the
(non)Whole its consistency by endlessly foreclosing an outplace element – by endlessly
ascribing to it a non-identitarian attribute.
Yet Badiou does not stop there; proposing a demanding and challenging argument, he
supplements structural dialectic’s algebra of places (elements) with materialist dialectic’s
topology forces (parts exceeding elements – Cantor’s Theorem). In transposing Lacan’s
psychoanalysis double – lack-of-being/being-of-lack – we now also obtain the lacking of
a lack – an anxious term – ravaging along the places and annulling the previous esplace
by sheer force. It is where the interruption of the silent sliding of repetitions occurs via
an excess over the place – a torsion. This crossing of two lacks is crucial; we have repetition
and coherence (the indefinite resolute to socio-economic problems) andwe have force and
destruction (indefinite purging of the outplace(d) part), inscribing a new consistency and
repetition of places. Torsion amounts to a twofold operation: first, overturning the loss
indicated by the absence of cause in the structure of places and second, producing
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consistency from excess. If Badiou takes on the structural dialectic’s metonymies in con-
tradiction between the existence of the Real and the causal effect of the lack/void, he sec-
ondly applies a historical dialectic of force and destruction, creating a form of non-order in
them. The subject is inscribed in their crossing: on the one hand, the metonymical sliding
of the lack of being, on the other, being of a lack as an excessivemoment. The excessmarks
the determination of determination, an inner purge in the formula A(Ap(A)).
At this point we have to make our preliminary concluding remarks according to the
assessment of Badiou’s notional stance. While in Theory of the Subject he remains faithful
to Hegel’s handling of logic – the constitutive scission – in pure and placed something, he
reiterates them into notions of presentation and representation (i.e. situation and state of
situation) in Being and Event or the transcendental regimes of a (possible) world in Logics
of Worlds. The problem is that both of these works render the original logic opaque and
result in the loss of any capacity in dealing with determining economic content of situ-
ations. Linking together Rancière’s notion of Police and Badiou’s State of Situation, we get
the political domain understood as an abstract universal, but devoid of any concrete
relation to the mode or relations of production, or rather to the economic institutional
framework. In all his later work, Badiou dismisses “economism” as an ideological
instance of today’s state of situation – the reign of bodies and languages. Similarly, Ran-
cière juxtaposes the disjunctive relation between police and politics proper, by ascribing
to the former all conditioning of economic strata and, simultaneously barring all imma-
nent historical conditions for the commencement of the latter. Let us subvert the current
outline and call “objective” a set of processes and practices leading to the un-pure, bour-
geois, reactive placing of the force – inherent in state apparatuses or controlled civil
(unionist) gatherings – ending in relentless reconfigurations of esplace. On the contrary,
we call “subjective” a contingent concentration of a force, one being internally purged, as
a sheer intervention into the relation between A (the police counting of private property)
and the placed A/P (the institutional realm of corporations). Returning now to Hegel,
who remains concise here; his pathway towards the notional development of State pre-
supposes the institution of police as a first step, the other being the corporation. As a cor-
ollary, it follows, for the former, a fundamental contradiction discerning property from
non-property relation (in Marxian terms, the opposition between owner of money and
possessor of labour power), for the latter, a principal contradiction delineating an asym-
metric distribution of information and knowledge17 along the corporate esplace – the
well-informed and the ill-informed. The transfer of information and knowledge is dis-
tributed through market-determined topologies and induces political bodies, not the
other way around.
In the knotting of these contradictions should one perceive adjacent vector-forces – a
torsion – of economic folding into a political subjectivity. But on the other hand, it is the
mainstream theoretical discourse that over-sutures the resolution for this minimal gap
for the subject; by actively endorsing and resolving the enunciated wrong with technical
redistribution of (property) rights.
A (re)turn from Badiou’s State-of-situation to Hegel’s State
The immanent laws of technological progress structure the relations of civil and modern
societies. Adam Smith sought the causes for the rise of modern civil society in the
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specialization and the division of labour. Similarly to Hegel’s “cunning of reason”,
Smith’s “invisible hand” introduced a teleological principle of counting and ordering
for civil society by designated agents; firstly, based on the stage of technology as a coor-
dinative mechanism for an individual’s needs and wants, and secondly, on the invisible
market circulation of (non)ownership rights. As already mentioned, Hegel was comple-
tely aware of these facts in Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, ascribing to the police the
protection of property and to the corporation the mode of production, its business
endeavour and state of technology. The division of labour adheres to the system of
needs, appertaining to its universality over all particular (business) aspirations in a
society. The police order, in the broader sense of the term, is called upon to allocate
and mitigate these (legal) rights (of appearing in the sensible; of saying, doing, etc.) –
this is how one should approach Rancière’s police count in Disagreement. A notion, sub-
suming the symbolic constitution of people and things in relation to private property.
Today’s variation of counting and including parts of social body is the operation in
the distribution of the sensible on the predicate of property rights, attached to the
laws of kinship and inherited wealth – classed individual particularities. The main
bugbear for the protection of property rights remains the administration of justice, con-
stituting another significant institutional pillar in the capitalist framework, to which new
economic policies turn the most.18 If the police institution represents a negative force in
civil society for mediating the producer-consumer relations, Hegel posits its counterpart
in corporation as a positive force of free individual enterprises, knitting a technological
network for the organization of labour. Such unity is first-hand determined as a result of
the police’s counting of properties, of bodies, roles and places, but is also succeeded with
positive incentives to aid the individual’s particular needs and interests – the retroactive
positing of the organization of labour. He anticipates the emergence of particular estates,
whose unity is determined by economic attributes – labour organized at a specific stage of
technology. Put together, the police and corporation institution, in their sublation, form
the content of the State. What Hegel retroactively posits is that this sublated unity gives
substance to the developing system of needs, once it accomplishes and fulfils this process
in the form of the objective spirit coming to be – the State. The State as such is always
something preceding the Civil Society. The latter is formed only in a state and can
only emerge from such a unity that a State is.19 For the State to achieve such an incor-
porate activity, the unity of both institutions must be presupposed.
Indeed, it is a police matter to mitigate the relations of production and distribution, by
protecting the benefits stemming from these rights and suppressing outcries of a wrong.
Conversely, it will be the police as a public institution regulating and protecting the
general interest of individuals against the free and unimpeded circulation of commod-
ities. Ideally, its role is to watch over the masses, protecting them from particular interests
of homogeneous groups in an economically mature framework. On the other hand, it is
the corporation (apart from the family) that gives individuals a private substantial merit
inasmuch as it organizes the masses in production processes (i.e. in industrial production
lines, co-working services, etc.). Police and corporation, public and private, residing side
by side, in mutual co-determination outline an abstract dividing line. This border intro-
duces a peculiar site – a no man’s land – a paradoxical interval (recall Rancière’s handling
of blaberon) distinguishing different identities of multiplicities. A place of political sub-
jectivation – the site of a torsion – absolute recoil.20 If we return one last time to our
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differentiation between Rancière’s and Badiou’s distinction Police/State-of-situation and
Hegel’s Police/Corporation unity, we have the Police/State-of-situation count assigning
parts of the social body, based on some predication. We traced the case that it is the prop-
erty relation over means of production vis-à-vis the labourer’s own labour-capacity as
non-property, as Marx would say, that encounters a lack, i.e. its encounter with non-
property, inexistent, the rabble. If we were to stop here, we shall always find some par-
ticular political intervention (as in the case of the leftist and rightist relapses) struggling
for their universalization. It is the automaticity of the corporate (or more broadly econ-
omic, market) system that confronts these upshots and objectifies them for its goal – in
the policies for the resolution of social anomalies, (negative) social externalities. These
economic policies of today’s states do so frequently, they prowl on any subject-excess
in order to re-count it back to normal functioning, foreclosing any transparency of a
lack. Rancière and Badiou perhaps all too quickly omit the institution of corporation
and end up losing any immanent disposition of economic conditions set upon (or
rather, leading to) induced singularities of political practices – the uncovering and
stating of a wrong. Hegel’s insight, how police maintains control in actu over property
rights of different multiplicities in social body, how the corporation endows a societal
institutional framework with a technological dimension, and thus unification, which
finally leads from Civil Society to State, should be taken as one of the more profound
and consistent points of departure in understanding the configuration of social parts
in capitalist institutional framework.
Notes
1. Galbraith, Economics in Perspective, 285.
2. In the materialist sense, this type of generic human existence lends itself to the material
appropriation of landed wealth – the minimum represented with a site where one exists –
and to the material transformation of the fruits of Nature. Hegel has characterized such a
relation as an essential relation, inaugurating the “truth of appearance”; a point of reference
later undertaken by both Karl Marx and Alain Badiou. Marx clearly had Hegel and the
essential relation in his sight when he progressed to the inner laws of value-form unfolding
– i.e. into the relations between commodity and the money object, between use and
exchange value, relative and equivalent form of value. The problem in question is of
course the relation between a particular, universal and singular commodity in the totality
of circulation. In Marx, on the other hand, the correlation of the forces inherent in the essen-
tial relation is analogically evoked as the relation among commodities and money. As for
Badiou, his Theory of the Subject (1982) devotes an entire chapter to Hegel’s handling of
essential relation and forces by examining the exposition of parts and the whole problem,
with force and its expression, i.e. with interiority and exteriority. For Badiou, this gap rep-
resents no less than the question of positioning the subjectivity in Hegel.
3. For a detailed study on police origins see Robinson, “The Origin and Evolution”.
4. Indeed, Marx goes here by interpreting the corporations as being the materialism of
bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy being the spiritualism of corporations. He tilts his view
almost exclusively on the part of corporation vis-à-vis to the police. We should also add
that Marx’s argument is grounded on an already fully developed notion of the State,
having on the one hand its operative moments (police, judiciary) embodied in The Execu-
tive Power, while on the other maintaining corporation’s determinate particular interests (as
part of the State). Our argument is to emphasize the ex ante importance of the notions police
and corporation, as necessary moments in the unfolding of the state, i.e. before actually
arriving to a fully developed notion.
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5. See Johnson, “Critical Theory of the Police”.
6. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, 191.
7. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, 168. My translation. [Die substantielle Grundlage des Ganzen
ist das Recht des Eigentums. Das System der Bedürfnisse und dessen Verwickelung kann gar
nicht bestehen ohne das Recht. Die grösste Beförderung, die man der Industrie zuteil
werden lassen kann, ist eine strikte und feste Rechtspflege. Dazu gehört weiter als Grund-
lage, dass das Eigentum in seiner vollständigen Wirklichkeit vorhanden sei.]
8. Cf. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, 193.
9. In the following passages, our main reference will be Badiou’s dialectical formulation intro-
duced in Theory of the Subject. We shall also critically acclaim and delimit it from the
current principle of Police/State of situation’s count of elements or parts.
10. Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble, 16.
11. As far as institutional logic is concerned, we shall echo the ensemblistic-identitarian logic of
Cornelius Castoriadis, developed in his The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975). Our
explication of institutions is bound with his conception of the imaginary, on the notions
of legein and teukhein (as a form of techne). Legein is an operation of distinguish-choose-
posit-assemble-count-say, while adding elements to a set, naming it and positing its exist-
ence. Teukhein determines the principles of dynamic in the social imaginary of these sets,
“counted-as-one”, by an operation of assembling-adjusting-making-constructing, represent-
ing she structure of places of these “counted-as-one(s)”.
12. Ranging from Theory of Contradiction, Of Ideology, The Rational Kernel of the Hegelian Dia-
lectic, and Theory of the Subject.
13. Badiou, Theory of the Subject, 6.
14. For future reference, recall the rough interchangeability between splace (Theory of the
Subject), state of situation (Being and Event) and world (Logics of Worlds).
15. Badiou, The Rational Kernel, 58.
16. Badiou, Theory of the Subject, 31.
17. Contemporary economic theory knows these occurrences under the name “market imper-
fections” or “imperfect markets”. Such encircling of the object of theoretical analysis oblit-
erates the true dimension of both antagonisms in question, so that the imperfections always
remain a salvageable task for capitalist reinvention.
18. The gaining influence of the New Institutional Economics in mainstream economic thought.
19. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, 208. My translation. [Der Staat als solcher ist immer etwas
Früheres als die bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Diese bildet sich nur im Staat aus, und sie kann
nur innerhalb der ganzen Einheit, die der Staat ist, hervortreten.]
20. Slavoj Žižek identifies at play in the symbolic order the Hegelian notion of “absolute recoil”.
An operation, one that can also be paralleled with Badiou’s “torsion” and in our
interpretation deemed for the Police/Corporation dialectic leading to the constitution of
the State.
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